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HOW RATIONAL IS THE PURCHASE OF LIFE INSURANCE?
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether middle age American households purchase
adequate amounts of life insurance. The analysis is based on SRI
International's 1980, 1982, and 1984 surveys of the financial positions of
American households. Our findings indicate that a significant minority of
American wives are highly under—insured with respect to the possible deaths of
their husbands. Under the assumption that actuarially fair annuities are
available we find that just over 30 percent of wives are inadequately insured,
by which we mean they would suffer a loss in their rate of sustainable
consumption of at least 30 percent in the event of being widowed. If one
assumes that annuities are not available the fraction of wives who are
inadequately insured is 24 percent. These findings on inadequate life
insurance are even more striking if one focuses on those households in which
over half of the couple's present expected value of resources is dependent on
the husband's survival. The fraction of wives in such households who are
inadequately insured is 41 percent ifoneassumes fair annuities are
available, and 31 percent if one assumes annuities are unavailable. The
problem of inadequate insurance is even more significant among households of
more modest means. Almost half of wives in such households who are in need of
life insurance protection are inadequately insured, and this statement holds
regardless of whether fair annuities are available. The results of this paper
together with those of the related literature strongly suggest that raising
the share of social security benefits that are paid to surviving spouses as
well as increasing in employer—provided group life insurance could have a very
considerable impact on the alleviation of poverty among widows, especially
elderly widows.
Alan J.Auerbach Laurence J.Kotlikoff
National Bureau of Economic Boston University and
Research and National Bureau of Economic Research
University of Pennsylvania 1050 Massachusetts Ave




In 1987, a total of 7.1 trillion dollars of life insurance (measured at
face value) was held by U.S. households. Yet, despite this large aggregate
figure, there remains the question of whether insurance purchases are
appropriate to individual circumstances. The familiar adage that life
insurance is "sold, not bought" suggests a certain lack of information on the
part of households concerning the function of life insurance and the
appropriate level of coverage. How well households meet their insurance needs
is an extremely important policy issue for it influences not only the
incidence of poverty among widows, particularly elderly widows, but also the
efficacy of social insurance schemes aimed at alleviating such poverty. If
poverty of widows is merely an extension of their poverty while married, then
social insurance aimed at the general problem of poverty may be most
appropriate. However, if poverty among widows is attributable to insufficient
insurance purchases by deceased spouses, then survivor insurance is the more
appropriate policy response.
This paper asks whether households act rationally in purchasing life
insurance. It extends our earlier analysis of this issue (Auerbach and
Kotlikoff, 1987) through the use of a considerably richer data set and by
considering the possibility that annuities are unavailable or too expensive to
warrant its purchase. The new data are SRI International's 1980, 1982, and
1984 surveys of the financial positions of American households. While our—2—
previous results were limited to young elderly households whose heads ranged
from 58 to 65 in age, the present paper considers younger households whose
heads are between 35 and 55 years old. Younger households are likely to have
a greater fraction of their remaining lifetime resources tied up in human
wealth and, as a consequence may be in greater need of life insurance.
The findings in this study reinforce our previous finding about the
pervasive inadequacy of insurance coverage. Under the assumption that
actuarially fair annuities are available we find that just over 30 percent of
wives are inadequately insured, by which we mean they would suffer a loss in
their rate of sustainable consumption of at least 30 percent in the event of
being widowed. If one assumes that annuities are not available the fraction
of wives who are inadequately insured is 24 percent. These findings on
inadequate life insurance are even more striking if one focuses on those
households where the husband has no employer—provided group coverage and where
the wife is at risk; "at risk" refers to a situation in which over half of the
couple's present expected value of resources is tied up in income streams
contingent on the husband's survival. The fraction of such wives who are
inadequately insured is 41 percent, if one assumes fair annuities are
available, and 31 percent, if one assumes annuities are not available. This
degree of under—insurance suggests irrational decision—making or, at a
minimum, imperfectly informed decision making.
The new data set has some special information bearing on the failure of
households to insure adequately. The data indicate the way in which life
insurance is obtained (provision of group insurance through employers versus
individual purchase) and the frequency with which individual life insurance
policies are updated. These data can be used to determine whether provision
by employers of life insurance affects the total level of coverage and the—3—
diligence of individual households in determining how much insurance to
purchase. We find that group coverage does positively affect the level of
total coverage; households with group policies are somewhat more adequately
insured than those without, although over 26 percent of households with group
policies still have inadequate coverage. The fact that households with group
coverage are somewhat better insured is not surprising since many at risk
households without group coverage hold little or no insurance and/or have not
updated their insurance coverage for several years.
The data on adjustment of individual life insurance policies is quite
telling. Just over 60 percent of the sample of all husbands and 63 percent of
those husbands with no group insurance report they have not changed their
individual life insurance policies in the last 5 years. Given that the data
cover a period of rapid inflation, this seems prima facie evidence against a
view of rational insurance purchase.
The paper proceeds in the second section with a brief summary of the
findings of our previous paper and a discussion of several related papers.
Section III discusses our method for assessing the adequacy of life insurance
assuming the availability of actuarially fair annuities as well as life
insurance. Section IV indicates how the method for assessing the adequacy of
life insurance needs to be modified if annuities are not available.
Specifically, we use a dynamic programming algorithm to deal with the case
that annuities are not available and present results both for the cases that
annuities are and are not available. Section V describes the SRI data and the
construction of key variables. Section VI presents our findings on the
adequacy of insurance, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Literature Review-4-
The literature bearing on the adequacy of life insurance is, to our
knowledge, rather limited. It appears that each of the relevant studies has
focused on the elderly, and each has used the Retirement History Survey. As a
group these analyses support a conclusion that inadequate purchase of life
insurance is an important explanation for the poverty of elderly widows.
As in this paper, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) consider the adequacy of
life insurance by examining changes in the affordable standards of living of
hypothetical widows before and after the hypothetical deaths of their
husbands. Auerbach and Kotlikoff also consider changes in living standards of
actualwidows. Their procedure involves comparing I) the constant and equal
consumption streams that could be guaranteed for both the husband and wife,
when they are both alive, if the couple purchased the appropriate amount of
life insurance with 2) the constant consumption stream that an actual or
hypothetical surviving widow would be able to finance based on the resources
she has or would have upon the actual or hypothetical death of her spouse.
These comparisons i.ndicated that a quarter of all actual and hypothetical
elderly widows and almost one half of the subset of these women who are at
risk are significantly under—insured for the death of their husband in the
sense that their affordable consumption stream did or would decline by at
least 25 percent.
In addition to examining in this manner the adequacy of life insurance
holdings, Auerbach and Kotlikoff construct a' econometric model of life
insurance demand and test whether the purchase of life insurance, inadequate
though it may be, is influenced by the determinants suggested by economic
theory. For example, do couples with most of their resources tied up in
income streams that are contingent on the husband's survival purchase more
life insurance than couples for whom this is not the case? Econometric-.5—
analysis of the demand for life insurance produces many results that are
strikingly at odds with theoretical predictions. One example is the
prediction that couples should offset government provision of survivor
insurance through social security by reducing their own holdings of life
insurance dollar for dollar. In contrast to the theoretical one—for—one
offset, Auerbach and Kotlikoff report essentially no private offset to
government provision of survivor insurance.
A subsequent study by Hurd and Wise (1987) considers the high incidence
of poverty among widows and asks whether a widow's poverty status arises as
the direct result of the death of her husband. The authors show that this is
definitely the case; they point out that while only 9 percent of their sample
of couples (in which the husband subsequently dies) are poor, approximately 35
percent of subsequent widows in this sample are poor. One problem with the
Hurd and Wise paper is that they compare poverty status based on income
immediately before and immediately after the husband's death. As Burkhauser,
Holden and Myers (1986) point out, surveys often incorrectly measure income in
the year a spouse dies by ignoring the income received by the decedent spouse
prior to that spouse's death. Indeed, according to Hurd and Wise the
transition out of poverty of widows after their first year of reported poverty
status is remarkably high. Hence, their analysis may overstate the number of
widows who become impoverished through the death of a spouse.
In addition to examining changes in the incomes of new widows, Hurd and
Wise compare the wealth of the couples in their sample with the wealth of the
surviving widows from these couples. They point out that a large portion of
the representative couple's wealth, including the present expected value of
the husband's income stream, is lost when the husband dies. While this is
true, it is to be expected and doesn't necessarily reflect inadequate holdings—6—
of insurance; the reason is that when a family member dies the family's total
expenditures ought also to fall. To pin down the inadequacy of insurance one
needs to consider whether the wealth that remains after the husband dies is
sufficient to maintain the widow's prior living standard —acalculation that
Hurd and Wise fail to do. Notwithstanding this problem of interpretation, the
Hurdand Wise data do convey a strong impression of inadequate life insurance
holdings by many elderly couples.
Two papers by Holden, Burkhauser, and Myers (1986) and Myers, Burkhauser,
and Holden (1986) that focus on the choice of pension survivor benefits also
lend support for the view of inadequate life insurance protection for actual
and potential widows. The two papers report that requiring all men with
private pensions to choose a survivor benefit option rather than a single life
annuity would have significantly mitigated the decline in living standards
experienced by surviving widows whose deceased husbands were covered by
private pensions.
Finally, Lewis (1989) consider3 the demand for life insurance, but only
for 150 American households. His theoretical model collapses all future time
periods into one period and fails to take Into account the possibility that
dependents, particular spouses, may die prior to the death of the household
head. His empirical analysis depends on his particular assumptions about
preferences, while our findings and the findings mentioned above are
nonparaxnetric, i.e., they are independent of the particular structure of
preferences. Lewis reports that his model fits his data well, but it is
difficult to compare our results with his because of differences in
methodologies.
III. Assessing the Adequacy of Life Insurance when AnnuitiesareAvailable—7—
In this section we assume that households can purchase annuities at
actuarially fair rates; the next section considers the case in which annuities
are not available. The assumption that annuities are available and
actuarially fair may seem unrealistic given that very few American households
own private annuity policies. However, if one considers annuities that are
provided in the form of private pensions, the fraction of American households
with significant explicit private (non—social security) annuities rises to
well over 50 percent. In addition, many, and perhaps, most American
households may have implicit annuities provided in the form of insurance
arrangements between themselves and their children. As Kotlikoff and Spivak
(1981) point out, even a small number of children .r other r2.tives can hedge
almost all of the risk associated with outliving one's resources. Given the
risk—sharing capacity of families and the fact that disproving such risk—
sharing is quite difficult and has not occurred, the benchmark assumption of
perfect annuity insurance seems well worth considering.
To determine whether household insurance purchases are adequate one must
measure the extent to which insurance reduces the impact of resource changes
associated with the death of a husband or wife. For example, consider a
family in which only the husband works and assume the wife would not work if
the husband dies. If the husband dies the consumable resources of the family
will be reduced due to the loss of his future labor and the possible loss of
pension income. They may also be reduced due to changes in the social
security benefits to which the family is entitled. At the same time, the
needs of the family will be lower, since the widow will require lower absolute
expenditures to achieve the same standard of living previously enjoyed by the
husband and wife. A simple test for the rationality of insurance coverage is
to compare the increase in resources provided by insurance on the husband's—8—
life (the difference between the face value and the cash value of all his life
insurance) with the additional resources (beyond her earnings, pension
benefits, social security benefits, and the couple's assets) his wife would
need to sustain her current standard of living in the event of his death. We
would expect husbands whose future labor income represents a significant
fraction of the present expected value of family resources to hold substantial
amounts of insurance. Wives in such families are clearly at risk in the sense
that inadequate life insurance purchases means a considerable decline in their
living standards in the event of their husbands' death.
The definition of living standard is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. In
this paper, as in our earlier work, we define living standard as the sustained
level of consumption of goods and services that can be guaranteed given the
household's current assets and current and future labor income and net
government transfers. Calculating this level both before and after the death
of a spouse requires information on the couple's net worth, future labor
earnings, private pensions, and social security benefits when both spouses are
alive as well when one of the spouses is dead.
The size of consumption streams that can be financed from a given amount
of resources depends on actuarial factors such as the interest rate, the
extent to which annuities are available, mortality probabilities, and
household economies of scale in joint consumption. Since many household goods
and services are consumed jointly, "two can live cheaper than one." That is,
a husband and wife may be able to enjoy the same standard of living at less
than twice the cost of this standard to a single individual. The greater is
the fraction of joint consumption, the greater the insurance needed to
maintain a given standard of living of a single surviving spouse. In the
extreme case in which all consumption is joint, it is necessary to insure—9--
fully each spouse's survival—contingent income stream in order to maintain the
surviving spouse's living standard. More generally, the necessary insurance
level would equal the present expected value of this income stream less the
reduction in necessary consumption spending occasioned by the individual's
death.
Because we do not know precisely how much consumption is of the joint
type, we present calculations based on the conservative assumption that no
such economies of scale in consumption exist. This has the effect of
understating (perhaps greatly) the degree of under—insurance, since we assume
that, in event one spouse dies, family consumption spending can be cut in half
without the surviving spouse surfering a decline in living standard.
The tables presented below that assume annuities are available compare
pre— and post widowhood (widowerhood) standards of living, where standard of
living is measured by the level annuity that could be financed with available
resources. More precisely, we calculate the combined present expected value
of resources of the couple befoLe the hypothetical death of a spouse and
compute the level annuity, Am, that could be purchased for each spouse based
on these resources and under the assumptions that annuities are actuarially
fair and that each spouse receives an equal annuity. Next, we determine the
annuity that could be afforded by the surviving spouse, A, based on the
surviving spouse's present expected values of life insurance including the
life insurance of the decedent spouse. The ratio of the second annuity to the
first annuity, (As/Am), which we refer to as the consumption ratio, is the
measure used for the adequacy of insurance. We characterize insurance as
inadequate only if this ratio is below .7.
The annuities are calculated in the following manner. Let FVRm be the




In equation (1), NW stands for net worth, PVE for the present expected value
of earnings of husband (h) and wife (w), PVB stands for the present expected
value of each individual's social security and pension benefits, and PVS
stands for the present expected value of each individual's survivor benefits,
the additional social security and pension benefits received if the other
spouse dies. NW includes the cash value of life insurance.
The effective term insurance amount, equal to the difference between face
and cash values of life insurance, does not appear in (1) because the
expression incorporates the assumption that insurance is actuarially fair.In
this case, the present expected values of insurance proceeds and payments are
equal and hence cancel in the expression1 Even though the insurance coverage
does not appear directly in expression (1), the ability of households to
purchase insurance is implicit in the conversion of future survival contingent
earnings and benefit streams into components of total householdwealth.
Each of the present expected values appearing in expression (1) is based
on information regarding each household's earnings and social security
benefits, the assumed interest rate, and age— and sex—specific mortality
probabilities. The interest rates and mortality probabilities are alsoused
to caiculate the annuities that each hounold could purchase for its members
with the present expected value of resources PVRm• If and are discount
factors for husband and wife based on these variables, the actuarially fair
level annuity for each that could be funded by PVRW is:
(2) Am —PVR./(Dh+Dw)—11—
Expression (2) tells us how much each husband and wife could receive
annually if they used all their wealth to purchase equal annuities. However,
families can not convert future earnings streams of one member directly into
annuitized consumption for the other. It is here that life insurance plays a
role by permitting households to transfer resources from states in which a
member is alive to states in which he or she is not. The extent to which this
will be necessary may be seen by calculating comparable annuities for the
cases when either the husband or wife is assumed to die. Let
(3) — + PVE5 + PVB5 + PVS d
In this expression, the first four variables on the right hand side are as
defined in expression (1). Here, however, they are calculated for spouse s
assuming the spouse's mate d has died. This has no effect on the value of net
worth, but it does change the present expected value of the earnings and
benefit streams. For example, the present expected value of s's survivor
benefits increases, since they are no longer contingent upon the other
spouse's death. The present expected value of S's earnings and own social
security and pension benefits may change, too, if the labor supply behavior of
s depends on whether s is widowed. The final term in expression (3), 'd' is
the effective term value (face less cash value) of life insurance received
upon the death of d. Note that NW should be understood to include the cash
value of life insurance.
As in expression (2), we may define the maximum level annuity that the
surviving spouse s can purchase with by:—12--
(4) A5 —PVRS/DS
where is the same annuity discount factor that appears in expression (2)
for the spouse s, equal to Dh or D. Assume for the moment that 1d equals
zero. Then if Am exceeds A5, we may infer that d's life must be insured in
order to maintain a constant level of consumption for s (i.e, for As=Am).
IV. Assessing Insurance Adequacy when Annuities are Not Available
In comparing the consumption annuities based on (2) and (4) we implicitly
assume that households can convert their present expected resources, PVRm and
JR, into annuities on actuarially fair terms. While life insurance
purchases are commonplace, the market for private annuities is less well
developed.2 The lack of an annuity market or a close substitute would pose no
problem with respect to our analysis if the husband and wife have all their
resources tied up in equal and constant survival—contingent income streams.
For such couples these income streams are equivalent to annuities, and our
measured values of Am and A5 would equal the true values, where "true" refers
to what is feasible given the annuity market imperfection. On the other hand
if the couple or surviving spouse has resources not contingent on survival
(such as assets) Am and A5 will be overstated relative to their true values.
Am will also be overstated even in the case that all resources aretied up in
survival contingent streams if one of the spouse's survival contingent income
stream exceeds that of the other. In this the case the couple effectively
needs to transfer, through life insurance, a portion of one spouse's survival
contingent stream (the one that is larger) into a nonsurvival contingent
resource in order to secure an equal consumption stream for the spouse with
the smaller income stream. Since the true values of both Am and A may be—13—
less than their measured values if annuity markets are imperfect, the measured
ratio of A to Am based on the assumption that fair annuities are available
may under— or overstate the true ratio.
In the case that annuities are unavailable the constant and equal (for
both spouses) lifetime consumption stream, Am, that can be afforded for the
couple must be calculated using dynamic programming. In contrast, the
affordable consumption stream for the surviving spouse, A5, in the absence of
annuities can be calculatea using the formula in (4), but taking the numerator
in (4) to be the present value (discounting only by the interest rate) of the
surviving spouse's resources and takirg the dnominator in (4) to be the
presentvalue (discounting only by the interest rate) discount factor.3
Ourcalculation of Amwhenannuities are not available proceeds as
follows. First we write, in equation (5), the budget constraining the size of
the constant affordable consumption stream, denoted of the couple if they
both live to their maximum length of life.
(5) +[ehiwl —2A hlLhl wlL1]
+
+ fe +e —2A — L —w L JR +[e+e—2A ]— 0 hn—lwn—l m hn—l nn—lwn—l wn—l hn wn in
In (5)W0 is the couple's initial (referenced as time zero) wealth, nstands
forthe maximum number of years during which at least one of the spouses could
be alive, R stands for one plus the interest rate, ehi and stand,
respectively,for the non—asset incomes of husbands and wives in period i, ir
andare the respective period i life insurance premiums per dollar of face
value of life insurance, and L andare the period i face values of term
(oneperiod) life insurance purchased on the husband's and wife's lives
respectively. The ehi and ei should be understood to include social security
retirement and dependent benefits as well as labor earnings.—14—
To use (5) to help calculate Lhfll, the husband's purchase of life
insurance at time n—I, we note that the couple will only purchase life
insurance on the husband's life (make Lhn_1 positive) if the wife is also
alive at n—i. If the wife is alive at n—i, the couple will set Lhfl..i
(assuming it is positive) such that if the husband dies the wife can afford t:o
consumeA in period n, thus:
(6) W0R' +[ehi+e1 —2A hlLhl_wiLwijR
+
+ [e +e —2A — L. — L ]R +[e+L+S—A ]= 0
hn—lwn—l in hn—ltm—Iwn—iwn—l wntm—i wn m
In(6) S isthe additional social security survivor benefit (above and
beyondthe wife's social security retirement benefit or dependent benefit)
available to the wife at time n if the husband dies prior to time
Subtracting (6) from (5) yields:
(7) L—e —A —S
nn—i hrt in wri
Thecorresponding equation for is:
(8) L—e —A —S
wn--l wn inhn
Now consider the possibility that the husband dies at the end of period n—2
and the wife is alive after n—2. To insure that the surviving wife can
continue to consume Amifthis occurs the couple must choose Lhfl..2 and L2
as well as their life insurance purchases prior to n—2 to satisfy:
(9) W0R +[ehi+e1 _2A hlLhl _wlLwi1 +
+ [e +e —2A —cL — L ]R2÷ [e +L +S —A ]R
hn—2 wn—2 in hn—2rm—2 wn—2wn—2 wn—lnn—2 wn—l in
+[e+S —A]—O wn wn in—15—
If we subtract (9) from (6) and subtract the analogous equations for the case
the wife dies prior to the husband we find:








Together with (7) and (8), the equations in (10) suggest a dynamic programming
algorithm for solving for Am when annuities are not available. The algorithm
starts by choosing a guess for the value of A.m Given this guess and our
estimated values of non—asset income and survivor benefit streams, we use
equations (7) and (8) to determine the period n—i purch- of lif insurance
assuming the derived values of Lhfll and are nonnegative. If either or
both of the derived values are negative we have a situation in which the
couple would like to purchase one or more annuities. In this case we set the
values of Lhnl and\or L.1 equal to zero; i.e., when a derived demand for
life insurance is negative we constrain its purchase to be zero.
Given the nonnegative values of and we calculate nonnegative
values of Lhn2 and L2 using (10) and the rule that any negative derived
demand for life insurance is set to zero. Since the first order difference
equations (10) relating life insurance in two adjacent periods holds for any
two periods we can use (10) to calculate nonnegative values of life insurance
for the husband and wife at each period between zero and n. However, these
calculated values of the time paths of life insurance purchases depend on the
guess of Am and the initial guess of Am may not satisfy the budget constraint
given in (5). Hence, we insert into (5) the calculated paths of life
insurance purchases based on the initial guess of Am and use the resulting
equation to solve for a new value of Am We take as our second guess of Am a—16—
weighted average of the first guess and this value and procedure to calculate
a second time path of life insurance purchases. We continue with this Guass—
Seidel iteration until the guessed value of Am equals the calculated value of
Am i.e. until we reach a fixed point. In implementing this algorithm we
assume that life insurance can be purchased on an actuarially fair basis,
hence we set lrh and equal to R1 times the respective probabilities of




Our data come from three waves of the Survey of Consumer Financial
Decisions conducted by SRI International. The surveys were conducted in 1980,
1982 and 1984, and are attractive because of the detailed information on
assets and insurance and the oversampling of wealthy households. While there
is some overlap among households covered by the three cross sections, there
are few families for which usable records are available for more than one
year. Therefore, our analysis simply pools the observations from the three
waves of the survey. All variables are measured in constant 1985 dollars.
We consider only families in which both husband and wife are present in
the household, the husband is working, and in which the husband is age 35 to
55. Given the method of reporting household income data, several records had
to be eliminated due to our inability to distinguish between husband's and
wife's labor income. The labor incomes of the husband and the wife are not
separately reported in the surveys. Rather the surveys report total labor
income and the share of total (labor plus nonlabor) income received by the
husband, wife, and others. In selecting the sample we eliminate records in—17—
which the income shares do not add up to 100 percent. We also delete
observations in which the head's labor income is $5000 or less.
These sample selection criteria leave a total of 1243 observations: 447
from 1980, 439 from 1982 and 357 from 1984. Refore turning to our results we
briefly review the construction of variables needed to calculate the present
expected values in expressions (1) and (3) and the consumption annuities in
(2) and (4).
Net Worth
The SRI data include a fairly completed list of assets and liabilities.
The asset data include the market values of ownership of businesses, real
estate (including one's home), stocks, bonds, money market funds, checking and
savings accounts, business enterprises, and annuities IRA/Keogh accounts,
value of autos, RVs, boats, planes and tangible assets, employer—provided
pension plans (available only for 1980 and 1982), and the cash value of life
insurance. The liabilities include real estate mortgages, other home related
loans, loans for autos, RVs, boats, planes, investment secured loans, all
unsecured and other loans, borrowing on lines of credit, cash value loans, and
credit card balances.
Present Expected Value of Earnings
Unfortunately the surveys report only current labor earnings. For our
base case we assume that future earnings through age 65 (the assumed
retirement age) equal current earnings adjusted for growth for both husbands
and wives; hence, wives who are not working at the time of the survey are
assigned human wealth of zero in the base case. As this assumption may bias
our findings toward insurance inadequacy, we also consider alternative—18—
assumptions concerning wives' future earnings. The assumed rate of growth of
real earnings is zero percent. This assumption of a zero growth rate of real
earnings biases our results toward a finding of greater insurance adequacy.
To form the present expected value of human wealth for both the husband and
wife we discount future real earnings streams at a 5 percent real rate of
interest and apply the sex—specific mortality probabilities reported in Faber
and Wade (1983).
The projection of future earnings based o. current earnings may, of
course, under— or overstate the individuals' true present expected value of
earnings. The implication of this measurement problem for assessing insurance
adequacy is particularly acute for wives who report they are not working at
the time of the interview. Such wives may normally be in the labor force or
may actively be engaged in unmeasured but valuable home production at the time
of the survey. Alternatively, such wives may intend to work in the future if
their husbands died. In either case, our estimate of the annuity ratio for
hypothetical widows will overstate the problem of inadequate insurance.
Hence, in addition to the base case, we consider two other assumptions about
the future earnings of wives who report zero earnings. The first is that
wives with zero reported earnings earn in each year in the future an amount
equal to the earnings level predicted by a regression relating the earnings of
working wives to their characteristics.5 The second is that wives with zero
reported earnings earn zero while their husbeiLids are alive, but go to work if
their husband dies earning the amount predicted by the working wives' earnings
regression.
Pens ions
Unfortunately, there is very limited information in the survey concerning
private pensions and what information is available is available only for 1980—19—
and 1982. For these years the questionnaire contains information on the value
of employer pension plans, which we include in our measure of net worth for
those years. These data appear to understate the amount of pension wealth.
Since most pensions during this period did not offer automatic joint survivor
benefits this understatement of pension wealth is likely to understate the
need for life insurance by understating the resources lost upon a husband's
death.
Taxes
In calculating the present expected values of the husband's and wife's
future labor earnings, we reduced the projected stream of annual labor
earnings by 20 percent. While this is a crude calculation it appears to be in
the right order of magnitude for at least middle income households. The 20
percent figure, by the way, is meant to include both average federal income
taxes, average employee social security taxes, and average state and local
taxes. The 20 percent figure may be a bit high for low income (relative to
our data) households, but if so, this will, by reducing the size of human
wealth, lead to an overstatement of insurance adequacy for such households.
For higher income households the simple 20 percent average tax rate adjustment
may lead to a small overstatement of insurance inadequacy. Given that the
problem of inadequate life insurance is most severe for poorer households this
assumption appears to bias the findings toward greater insurance adequacy.
Present Expected Value of Social Security Benefits
The construction of social security wealth is based on projected past as
well as future earnings streams of the husband and wife. Given these earnings
streams we followed Social Security law as amended in 1983 in determining the—20--
amount of retirement, dependent, and survivor benefits available to each
spouse under each mortality contingency of the husband and wife. Each
individual's future Social Security benefit is determined based on the
individual's projected future and past earnings. The projected past earnings
are determined by taking current earnings and reducing them in real terms
according to the historical rate of growth of real compensation per hour in
the business sector reported in The Economic Report of the President 1987.
Our procedure for computing social security wealth takes into account
that each spouse's completed earnings history will depend on that spouse's
date of death. This is important for computing the present expected value of
survivor benefits when both members of the couple are still alive; for
example, the survivor benefit available to a surviving wife at say age 66 will
be based on a short earnings history if the husband died at a young age and a
long earnings history if the husband died in his 60s. Our method of
calculating survivor benefits properly adjusts for the probability that a
spouse will die at an early age and, as a result, have a short earnings
history.
Insurance
All three of the SRI surveys ask about the husband's and wife's
individual insurance and the husband's group insurance. However, only the
1982 and 1984 surveys report the wife's group insurance.
VI.Findings
Characteristicsof the Data
We begin with a table that provides an overall picture of the composition
of household resources in the sample. Each column in Table I provides a—21—
percentage breakdown of the resource variable PVRmforfamilies in a
particular wealth range, starting in the first column with those families
having between 100 thousand and 250 thousand dollars of total wealth6 (4
percent of the sample) through those having between 250 and 500 thousand
dollars of wealth (29 percent of the sample), between 500 thousand and 750
thousand (36 percent of the sample), between 750 thousand and 1 million
dollars (18 percent of the sample) and more than I million dollars (13
percent). The table also displays for each wealth class theaverage face
values of insurance for husbands. The face value of insurancecoverage is not
a component of a couple's overall wealth, PVR.m.Weprovide the insurance
numbers to offer some initial insight into the patterns of insurancecoverage
and adequacy.
The table indicates several patterns regarding the composition of
resources. First, the fraction of resources accounted for by net worth
increases with total resources, rising from 10 percent for those with total
resources of 100—250 thousand to 33 percent for those with resources above 1
million. Second, the fraction of total PVR.accountedfor by wives' human
wealth also increases through the first four categories. The sumofthese two
componentsincreases throughout, from 17 percent for the lowest resourcegroup
to 43percent for the highest. Since these are the two major components of
resources that do not decline when a husband dies, there is clearly a greater
need for insurance to protect wives' consumptionatlower wealth levels. An
examinationof insurance coverage, however, does not reflect this greater
need. While husbands' human wealth accounts for 55percentof family
resources for the lowest resource group, declining to 50 percent for the
highest resource group, the ratio of husbands' insurance to overall resources
is 8 percent for the first group and 14 percent for the latter. Note that for—22—
the lowest resource group only 15 percent of the husband's human wealth is
insured on average. The corresponding figure for the highest resource group
is 28 percent.
Table 2 presents the distribution of observations by age and PVRm
category. Among younger households, whose heads are age 35 to 39, insurance
on the husband as a percentage of PVRm is similar to that for the entire
sample except for the lowest PVRm class. For the five different PVRm classes
starting with the lowest, husbands' life insurance is 10 percent, 9 percent, 9
percent, 11 percent, and 17 percent of PVRm. The corresponding percentages
for the subsample age 50 to 55 are 5 percent, 8 percent, 9 percent, 11
percent, and 15 percent.
Table 2 also indicates the fraction of households in each cell who are at
risk, where at risk means that over half of the household's PVRm consists of
income flows that are contingent on the husband's survival. Finally, it
reports the fraction of households with positive life insurance on the
husband's life. The table indicat.s that most (74% for the entire sample)
households are at risk, and most (86% for the entire sample) have insurance on
the husband's life. Among households falling in the lowest three PVRm ranges
the cell fraction at risk often exceeds the cell fraction with insurance on
the husband,
Analysis of Insurance Adequacy
Hypothetical Widows Assuxnjn Annuities are Available
In Table 3 we assume the availability of actuarially fair annuities and
present consumption ratios for hypothetical widows under the base case
assumption that future earnings equal current earnings adjusted for growth. A
total of 15 percent of the potential widows have an annuity ratio (A5/A,) of—23—
less than .5; 30 percent have a ratio below .7. Inadequate insurance holdings
is more prevalent among the lower PVRm groups. Of the 410 hypothetical widows
from households with PVRm less than $500,000, 19 percent have consumption
ratios below .5, and 38 percent have ratios below .7. In contrast only 6
percent of the potential widows in the highest PVR.. have a ratio less than .5,
and only 17 percent have ratios below .7.
The degree of measured insurance inadequacy depends on our estimate of
the future earnings of nonworking wives. Table 4 shows the implications for
the distribution of consumption ratios of assuming that wives with no reported
earnings earn an amount predicted by an earnings regression both 1) when the
husband is alive and when he is dead and 2) only aLer he is dead. Under the
first alternative assumption (all wives always work) the percentage of widows
with ratios below .7 drops from 30 percent in the base case to 19 percent.
Under the second assumption (all widows work) the percentage below .7 totals
16 percent. While substantially smaller than the base case numbers, these
figures still suggest an important minority of hypothetical widows are
underinsured.
Tables 5 and 6 repeat Tables 3 and 4, but for 888 of the 1243 (71
percent) women who are at risk. Under the base case earnings assumption 20
percent of women at risk have consumption ratios below .5; 41 percent have
ratios below .7. These figures can be compared with the 15 percent and 30
percent, the corresponding percentages for the entire sample in the base case.
If one assumes that nonworking wives always work upon the deaths of their
husbands, the fraction of wives with ratios below .5 drops from 20 percent to
6 percent, and the fraction below .7 drops from 41 percent to 23 percent.
In constrast to the earlier tables, Tables 5 and 6 seem more relevant to
the issue of adequacy because they focus on those couples who have the—24—
potential to make the mistake of un&rinsuring. But some of those couples at
riskmay not be making a voluntary decision about purchasing life insurance
because their employers are providing them with life insurance. The subsample
who permit the clearest test of rational insurance choice is, therefore,
households in which wives are at risk, but which have no employer—provided
group life insurance. Table 7 repeats Table 6 for this subsample of 382
observations. The results are striking. The base case fraction of wives with
consumption ratios below .5 is 26 percent; the fraction with ratios below .7
is 51 percent. In other words, slightly more than half of households who need
insurance and are not forced to hold insurance by their employers are
inadequately insured. The fraction of this sample that is inadequately
insured remains quite large even under the assumption that widows return to
work; in this case 31 percent of the 382 wives have consumption ratios below
.7.
Consumption Ratios of Hypothetical Widows WhenAnnuitiesare Unavailable
Table 8 analyzes insurance adequacy when annuities are unavailable. The
calculations are based on the dynamic programming algorithm of Section IV.
Table 8 should be compared with Table 3; while Table 3, which assumes
annuities are available, reports that 15 percent of wives have consumption
ratios under .5 and 30 percent have consumption ratios under .7, the
respective figures in Table 8 are 11 percent and 24 percent. Table 9 also
assumes annuities are unavailable, but considers wives who are at risk. This
table should be compared with Table 5. In Table 5, 20 percent of wives have
consumption ratios below .5, and 41 percent have ratios below .7. The
corresponding figures in Table 9 are 15 percent and 31 percent. Hence, the
assumption that annuities are unavailable mitigates somewhat the picture of—25—
insurance inadequacy, but even if one assumes that annuities, both explicit
and implicit, are completely unavailable almost a third of wives who need
insurance are inadequately insured. The picture of inadequate protection is
particularly clear for poorer wives. According to either Tables 5 and 9
almost half of wives at risk who fall in the lowest two resource categories
have consumption ratios below .7.
Hypothetical Widowers
In Table 10 we again assume that actuarially fair annuities are availab1
and present the base case consumption ratios for the complete sample of
hypothetical widowers based on the 1982 and 1984 surveys. Recall that the
1980 survey fails to ask about the wife's group insurance. Hence, there are
only 796 observations, which corresponds to the entire sample of 1243
observations less the 447 observations for 1980. The results in Table 10 are
also quite striking. Almost 90 percent of hypothetical widowers have
consumption ratios above 1.25. Llearly, there is no evidence of inadequate
insurance for this sample of husbands. Quite the contrary; the evidence
indicates that despite the advances of females in the labor market, husbands
remain the principal earners. While these numbers are sensitive to the
assumption of whether or not currently nonworking wives work in the future,
even if one imputes earnings for wives who report no earnings and assumes
wives always work, the fraction of husbands with consumption ratios below .7
is less than 1 percent. This assumption does, however, significantly reduce
the fraction of husbands whose ratio exceeds 1.75.
Adjustment of Individual Life Insurance Policies
Table 11 reports by age and PVR the fraction of the complete sample of
husbands who report changing their individual life insurance policies within—26—
the last five years. It also reports the fraction of recent adjusters for the
subsample that does not have group insurance. In total only 40 percent of the
sample reported altering their individual life insurance policies within the
last five years. For middle age men between 45 and 54 the fraction is even
smaller —lessthan 30 percent. The data suggest that people purchase their
insurance in their 30s and then fail to adjust their holdings for quite a
while. Given that the data cover a period during and immediately following a
rapid inflation, these figures are even more surprising.
Those with group insurance may not need to adjust their insurance as
often as those without group insurance. The extent of adjustment for the
subsample of men who do not report group insurance is only marginally larger.
Of the 542 men who do not have group insurance only 46 percent report changing
their coverage within the last 5 years.
OLS and Probit Estimation
Table 12 reports OLS and Probit regressions that "explain" who holds
inadequate amounts of insurance. We use the word "explain" cautiously because
some of the variables in these regressions, such as the group insurance
dummies, are, arguably, endogenous. The dependent variable in the OLS is the
wife's annuity ratio defined using current earnings and assuming fair
annuities are available. The probability at issue in the Probit is the
probability that the wife's annuity ratio is less than .70. The regressions
include dummies for education, sex, the husband's occupation, and the wife's
working status. They also include the ages of the husband and wife and the
level of PVRm•
There are a number of significant regressors in the OLS regression. The
dummy for working wife suggests that the fact that a wife works raises,—27—
ceteris paribus, her annuity ratio by almost .33. The variable WRATthat
captures the ratio of the household's net worth to its PVR.indicatesthat
increasing the net worth share by .10 would raise the annuity ratio for the
survivingwife by .14. The education dummies indicate that less educated
households are somewhat less adequately insured than better educated
households. Households with only group insurance or with some group insurance
have larger consumption ratios; however, the size of the group dummies is not
overwhelming. The fact that the group insurance dummy for those households
with both group and nongroup insurance is significant suggests, in and of
itself, that such households are not adjusting their insurance optimally at
the margin. If they were, they would fully offset the provision of group
insurance by their employer dollar for dollar by reducing their own positive
purchase of individual life insurance. In this regard it is worth pointing
out that of the 672 households reporting group insurance, 196 have only group
insurance.
Surprisingly, nonwhite wives are more adequately insured than are white
wives. This may reflect a more equal division of labor income within nonwhite
households. Also surprising is the finding that those with more young
children are less adequately insured than those with fewer children, Compared
to the omitted group, households in which the husband is either a blue or
white collar worker have less adequate consumption ratios. Finally, the
effects of age of the husband and wife on the adequacy of insurance coverage
are small.
Table 13 uses Probits to evaluate the affect of changes in the exogenous
variables on the probability that insurance coverage is inadequate (defined
here to be an AS/Am for the wife less than either .7 or less than .5). The
table takes as its base case a couple in which 1) the wife's and husband's—28—
ages and PVPm equal the averages in the sample, 2) the wife works, 3) the
wife's education is that of a high school graduate, 4) the husband's education
is that of a high school graduate, 5) the husband is a blue collar worker, and
6) the couple is white. The table indicates in the first row the probability
of underinsurance for households with these characteristics and then considers
changes in each of these characteristics holding the other characteristics
fixed. The table can easily be used to read off the effect of changes in
explanatory variables on the probability of underinsurance.
Changes in the wife's work status clearly has a very large effect on the
probability of underinsurance; the switch from working to nonworking status
raises the probability that the annuity ratio is less than .7 from 21 percent
to 71 percent. Other variables have less dramatic, but predictable effects on
the probability of underinsurance. For example, if the wife has less than a
full high school education, she is more likely (by almost 3 percentage points)
to be underinsured.
VII. Conclusion
The findings in this paper suggest that somewhere between 30 and 40
percent of middle age American wives in need of life insurance protection are
quite poorly insured. While this estimate may be biased upward because of
errors in forecasting the earnings and remarriage potential of wives, it is
biased downward because of the lack of adjustment for the economies of scale
in shared living associated with marriage (two can live cheaper than one).
Two additional reasons that the estimate may be biased downward are first,
that we have made no adjustment for the consumption requirements of young
children, and second, that we have excluded, because of the lack of data, most
pension benefits. On balance, we believe our estimate of insurance inadequacy—29—
understates the problem of inadequate life insurance holdings of American
households. In addition, our estimate is an average across wealthy households
and those of more modest means. For lower income households our estimate is
that almost half of those wives in need of life insurance protection are
inadequately insured.
The results of this paper together with those of our previous study and
the related literature strongly suggest that increased levels of social
security survivor insurance as well as ini.reases in employer—provided group
life insurance could have a very considerable impact on the alleviation of
poverty among widows, especially elderly widows.—30—
Table 1 The Size andCompositionof Resources and Insurance by PVR Class*
PVRm
Variable 100K—2501( 250K—500K500K—750K 750K-I. MI1.K I MILK +
PVR
average 205K 393K 614K 852K 1,522K
% of PVRm 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HWH
average 112K 211K 330K 446K 754K
% of PVRm 55% 54% 54% 52% 50%
average 14K 43K 96K 147K 154K
% of PVR.m 7% 11% 15% 17% 10%
S SWH
average 31K 43K 49K 52K 53K
% of PVRm 15% 11% 8% 6% 4%
S SWW
average 27K 40K 50K 55K 56K
% of PVR. 8% 7% 5% 4% 2%
average 21K 56K 91K 152K 505K
% of PVRm 10% 14% 15% 18%
IN
average 17K 32K 57K 88K 212K
% of PVRm 8% 8% 9% 10% 14
*Percentagesmay not sumto100% due to rounding.
K stands for thousands of dollars.
PVRm stands for the present expected value of the couple's resources.
HWH stands for the human wealth (present expected earnings) of the husband.
HWW stands for the human wealth (present expected earnings) of the wife.
SSWH stands for the social security wealth of the husband when both spouses
are alive.
SSWW stands for the social security wealth of the wife when both spouses are
alive.
NW stands for the couple's net worth.
IN stands for the face value of life insurance on the husband's life.—31—
Table2
Percentage at Risk and Percentage with Life Insurance by PVRmand Age
PVRCLASS
AgeGroup IOOK—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—].MI1,K 1 MIL.K +Total
3 5—39
#ofobs. 17 92 126 82 48 365
% at risk 94% 86% 91% 68% 65% 81%
% with IH 76% 83% 85% 87% 98% 86%
40—44
of obs. 13 64 120 63 42 302
% at risk 69% 83% 81% 71% 64% 76%
% with Hi 69% 75% 86% 90% 98% 85%
45—49
#ofobs. 8 91 98 46 34 277
% at risk100% 89% 68% 63% 53% 73%
% with IH 50% 84% 91% 78% 88% 85%
50—5 5
#ofobs. 11 114 98 40 36 299
% at risk 81% 84% 57% 52% 50% 62%
% with IH 81% 86% 83% 100% 94% 89%
Total
#ofobs. 49 361 442 231 160 1243
% at risk 86% 81% 76% 65% 59% 74%
% with IH 71% 83% 86% 88% 95% 86%
PVRmstandsfor the present expected value of the couple's resources.
IH stands for the face value of life insurance on the husband's life.—32—
Table 3*
Consumption Ratios for Wives using Current Earnings
PVRm CLASS
100X—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—i MI1.K 1 MIL.K +Total
<.10
#ofobs. 0 1 0 0 0 1
col. % 0% .3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.10 to .20
#ofobs. 2 3 3 1 2 11
col. % 4% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1%
.20 to .30
#ofobs. 1 9 5 1 19
col. % 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2%
.30 to .40
#ofobs. 4 22 24 10 3 63
col. % 8% 6% 5% 4% 2% 5%
.40 to .50
#ofobs. 8 28 34 13 4 87
col. % 16% 8% 8% 6% 3% 7%
.50 to .60
#ofobs. 7 24 34 8 4 77
col. % 14% 7% 8% 3% 3% 6%
.60 to .70
# of obs. 6 43 38 19 13 119
col. % 12% 12% 9% 8% 8% 10%
.70 to 1.00
# of abs. 8 126 139 62 32 367
cal. % 16% 35% 31% 27% 20% 30%
1.00 to 1.25
#ofabs. 8 68 113 70 41 300
col. % 16% 19% 26% 30% 26% 24%
1.25 +
#of abs. 5 37 52 45 60 199
cal. % 10% 10% 12% 19% 38% 16%
Total 49 361 442 231 160 1243
*Percentagesmay not sumto100% ..e to rounding.
PVRmstandsfor the present expected value f the couple's resources.—33—
Table 4
Consumption Ratios for Wives under Alternative Earnings Assumptions
Earnings Definition





















Consumption Ratios for Wives at Risk using Current Earnings*
PVRmCLASS
100K—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—i MIi,K I KIL.K +Total
<.10
ofobs. 0 1 0 0 0 1
col. % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.10 to .20
#ofobs. 2 3 3 1 2 11
coi. % 6% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
.20to .30
#ofobs. 1 9 5 3 1 19
col. % 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 2%
.30 to .40
#ofobs. 3 22 24 10 3 62
col. % 9% 8% 7% 7% 3% 7%
.40 to .50
#ofobs. 8 28 34 13 4 87
col. % 25% 10% 10% 9% 4% 10%
.50 to .60
#ofobs. 5 24 34 8 4 75
col. % 16% 8% 10% 5% 4% 8%
.60 to .70
#ofobs. 2 41 38 19 13 113
col. % 6% 14% 12% 13% 14% 13%
.70 to 1.00
#ofobs. 5 117 132 59 30 343
col. % 16% 41% 40% 39% 33%
1.00 to 1.25
#ofobs. 2 31 48 28 19 128
col. % 6% 11% 15% 19% 21% 14%
1.25 +
# ofobs. 4 9 11 10 15 49
col. % 13% 3% 3% 7% 16% 6%
Total 32 285 329 151 91 888
*Percentagesmay not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Table 6
Consumption Ratios for Wives at Risk
under Alternative Earnings Assumptions—35—
EarninEs Definition
SLI BaseCase All Wives always Work All Widows .1ork
% <.50 20% 7% 6%
% .50—.70 21% 21% 17%
% .70—1.00 39% 48% 45%
% 1.00—1.25 14% 17% 22%
% 1.25+ 6% 6% 11%—36—
Table 7
Consumption Ratios for Wives at Risk with no Group Insurance on Husband
under Alternative Earnings Assumptions
Earnings Definition
Base Case All Wives always Work All Widows Work
<.50 26% 11% 8%
.50—.70 25% 28% 23%
.70—1.00 35% 46% 46%
1.00—1.25 10% 11% 17%
1.25÷ 3% 3% 5%—37—
Table 8* Consumption Ratios for Wives Assuming Annuities are Unavailable
and Base Case Earnings
PVRmCLASS
SLATlI 100K—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—i MI1.K 1 MIL.K +Total
<.10
#ofobs. 0 1 0 0 0 1
col. % 0% .3% 0% 0% 0% .1%
.10to .20
#ofobs. 3 5 3 0 0 11
col. % 6% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1%
.20 to .30
#ofobs. 5 6 2 0 0 13
col. % 10% 2% .5% 0% 0% 1%
.30 to .40
of obs. 6 21 14 3 1. 45
col. % 12% 6% 3% 1% 1% 4%
.40to .50
#ofobs. 9 25 30 7 0 71
col. % 18% 7% 7% 3% 0% 6%
.50 to .60
#ofobs. 6 42 25 8 1 82
col. % 12% 12% 6% 3% 1% 7%
.60to .70
of obs. 5 30 31 10 1 77
col.% 10% 8% 7% 4% 1% 6%
.70 to 1.00
#ofobs. 7 79 125 50 8 269
col. % 14% 22% 28% 22% 5% 22%
1.00 to 1.25
#ofobs. 2 68 63 51 17 201
col. % 4% 19% 14% 22% 11% 16%
1.25+
# ofohs. 6 84 149 102 132 473
col. % 12% 23% 34% 44% 82% 38%
Total. 49 361 442 231 160 1243
*Percentagesmay not sumto100% due to rounding.
PVRmstandsfor the present expected value of the couple's resources.—38—
Table 9*Consumption Ratios forWives at Risk Assuming Annuities are
Unavailable and Base Case Earnings*
PVRCLASS
100K—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—i MIl.K 1.KIL.K÷Total
<.10
#ofobs. 0 1 0 0 0 1
col. % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.1.0 to .20
#ofobs. 3 5 3 0 0 11
col. % 9% 2% 1% 0% 0% 1%
.20 to .30
ofobs. 5 6 2 0 0 9
col. % 1.6% 2% 1% 0% 0% 1%
.30 to .40
#ofobs. 4 21 . 1 43
col. % 13% 7% 4% 2% 1% 5%
.40 to .50
#ofobs. 7 24 30 7 0 68
col. % 22% 8% 9% 5% 0% 8%
.50 to .60
#ofobs. 4 40 25 8 1 78
col. % 13% 14% 8% 5% 1% 9%
.60 to .70
#ofobs. 2 24 30 10 1 67
col. % 6% 8% 9% 7% 1% 8%
.70 to 1.00
#ofobs. 2 67 11]. 40 8 228
col. % 6% 24% 34% 26% 9% 26%
1.00 to 1.25
#ofobs. 1 50 44 33 12 140
col. % 3% 18% 13% 22% 13% 16%
1.25 +
#ofobs. 4 47 70 50 68 239
col. % 13% 16% 21% 33% 75% 27%
Total 32 285 329 151. 91 888
*Percentagesmay not sum to 100% due to roundirg.—39—
Table 10*
Consumption Ratios for Husbands using Current Earnings
PVRmQ
SLTh 100K—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—I. MI1.K I MILK +Total
<.5
ofobs. 0 0 0 0 0 0
col. % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.50 to .60
#ofobs. 0 0 1 0 0 1
col. % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
.60 to .70
#ofobs. 0 0 1 0 0 1
col. % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
70 to 1.00
#ofobs. 0 5 3 2 2 12
col. % 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2%
1.00 to 1.25
#ofobs. 4 19 26 17 5 71
col. % 10% 7% 7% 8% 4% 9%
1.25 ÷
#ofobs. 30 207 247 125 102 711
col.% 90% 92% 91% 91% 94% 89%
Total 34 231 278 144 109 796
*Percentagesmay not sumto100% due to rounding.
PVRmstandsfor the present expected value of the couplets resources.—40—
Table Li
Percentage of Husbands who Adjusted their Individual Life Insurance Policies
in the last 5 Years by PVRandAge
PVRTh CLASS
Age Group 100K—250K 250K—500K 500K—750K 750K—1MI1.K 1 MIL.K +Total
35—39
% adjusting 53% 47% 52% 54% 60% 52%
% nongroup 47% 43% 49% 48% 58% 68%
adjusting
40—44
% adjusting 31% 38% 52% 49% 52% 47%
% nongroup 31% 38% 48% 44% 52% 45%
adj usting
45—49
% adjusting 50% 19% 34% 35% 41% 30%
% nongroup 38% 18% 33% 35% 38% 29%
adjusting
50—5 5
% adjusting 27% 30% 22% 30% 17% 26%
% nongroup 18% 29% 21% 25% 14% 23%
adjusting
Total
% adjusting 41% 33% 41% 45% 44% 40%
% nongroup 35% 31% 39% 40% 42% 37%
adjusting
PVRmstandsfor the present expected value of the couple's resources.
IH stands for the face value of life insurance on the husband's life.—41—
Table 12






















































































PVRm standsfor the present expected value of the couple's resources. AR and
AWare ages of husband and wife. RACE —1for white, 0 otherwise. NKIDS is
numberofchildren at home. WRAT is the ratio of the coiple's networth, NW,
to PVRm EH1,EH2 and EW1,EW2 are pairs of education dummies for husband and
wife, respectively. EH1 and EW1 stands for less than high school education.
EH2 and EW2 stands for completed high school education, but did not attend
college. 01 and 02 are occupation dummiesforhusband. 01=1 if husband is
white collar worker, 0 otherwise. 02—1 if husband is a blue collar worker, 0
otherwise.Gl —l if husband has only group insurance, 0 otherwise. C2 —I
for household where husband has group insurance and husband and\or wife also
have individual insurance. WW —0if the wife works, 1 otherwise.—42—
Table13
Effects of Explanatory Variables 'n Probability A..,/Am<.5and
of the couple's resources. AH and
RACE —1for white, 0 otherwise. NKIDS is
is the ratio of the couple's networth, NW,
pairs of education dummies for husband and
PVRm stands for the present expected value
AW are ages of husband and wife.
number of children at home. WRAT
to PVRm EH1,EH2 and EW1,EW2 are
wife, respectively. EH1 and EW1 stands for less than high school education.
EH2 and EW2 stands for completed high school education, but did not attend
college. 01 and 02 are occupation c'ummiesforhusband.01—1 if husband is a
white collar worker, 0 otherwise. 02—1 if husband is a blue collar worker,0
otherwise. Cl —l if husband has only group insurance, 0 otherwise. C2 —1
for household where husband has group insurance and husband and\or wifealso
have individual insurance. WW —0if the wife works, I otherwise.
01 02 NXID Qi2 ￿1
771k4441 10 1 0 1
0.178.039
.QQ1S4441 1. 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156 0
0 10 .198.040 771k 41 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156
10 .140.025 771k44 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156
10 .067.013 771k4441 00 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156
10 .093.015 771k4441 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 .156
10 .139.025 771k4441 1 0 Q0 1 0 1 2 .156
0 10 .245.044 771k4441 1 0 1 Q0 1 2 .156
0 10 .159.039 771k4441 1 0 1 0 Q0 1 2 .156
10 .117.025 771k4441 1 0 1 0 1 .]. Q2 .156
0 10 .107.043 771k4441 1 0 1 0 10 Q .156
10.208.048 771k4441 1 0 1 0 10 1 2 .156
.005 77lk444l 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2..Q 0
10.713.396 771k4441 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156
.249.062 771k4441 10 1 0 1 0 1 2 .156
0
Q
00.202.036 771k4441 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2—43—
Notes
1.This could easily be generalized to the case of a fixed loading based on
the insurance amount, in which case this additional cost would be subtracted
from the present expected value of resources. For the sake of simplicity we
do not pursue this issue here.
2. As demonstrated by Yarn (1966), the purchase of an annuity is formally
equivalent to the sale of life insurance and vice versa. The fact that there
is a well developed insurance market in the U.S. means that the market for
sales of annuities is well developed. In contrast, the market for purchases
of annuities is quite thin. The two markets are, however, segmented. Those
selling annuities (buying life insurance) tend to be young and middle age,
while those interested in buying annuities (selling life insurance) are older
individuals. One possible explanation for the poor functioning of the annuit\
purchase market compared to the life insurance purchase market is that adversE
selection due to asymetric information is a greater problem in the annuity
purchase market.
3. In the case of a surviving spouse with no access to and who does
not wish to borrow against future earnings or other income, the spouse must
arrange his or her consumption such that if the spouse lives till the last
possible date of life the realized present value of the spouse's consumption
equals the realized present value of the spouse's resouces where both of thes€
present values are calculated as of the time the spouse becomes a widow or
widower. Hence, even though the surviving spouse faces lifespan uncertainty
the budget constraint is the same as that which arises if the spouse lived
till the last possible date of life with certainty. The intuition here is
that the spouse must consume t..king into account the possibility of living to
the last period in which case the present value budget constraint just
described can not be violated.
4. The social security survivor benefit depends, in general, on the age at
which the decedent spouse died because the age of death affects the decedent
spouse's earnings record. Our calculations of survivor benefits take this
feature of social security into account. However, to ease notation we do not
index S and Shi by the age at which the spouse dies.
5. These characteristics are a polynomial in age, education dummies,
occupation dummies, number of children.
6. In our sample there are no households with total resources below 100
thousand dollars.
7. The word explain is placed in quotations because not all of the right hand
side regressors, for example the group insurance dummies, are necessarily
exogenous.—44—
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